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Implementing the Stakeholder View
Learning Processes for a 
Changed Stakeholder Orientation
Marc Maurer and Sybille Sachs
University of Applied Sciences in Business and Administration Zurich, Switzerland
The stakeholder view of the corporation holds that the capacity of a business enter-
prise is to generate long-term value, which depends on critical stakeholders. This
paper proposes a learning framework to explain why and how firms adopt a broader
respectively changed stakeholder orientation or why they do not. Therefore, insights
gained by a former research project will be updated and extended (see Post et al.
2002b). Using concepts from organisational evolution, a dynamic three-stage frame-
work will be developed in order to analyse the paths of a firm’s stakeholder orientation
in practice and over longer periods of time. Preliminary results from case studies of
three large and complex firms are used to illustrate the development of propositions
and show first empirical evidence that the framework works in identifying generic
learning processes and longitudinally capturing the development of stakeholder
management in practice. 
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n the perspective of the stakeholder view, a firm’s stakeholder
relations can be seen as important sources for the firm’s value creation process.
Learning processes are salient for the implementation of a successful stakeholder
management especially with respect to a firm’s strategy, structure and culture
towards a broader1 stakeholder orientation. So far, little attention has been paid to
learning processes in order to achieve a desired level of stakeholder orientation. This
paper aims to propose a learning framework that permits the capture of organisational
learning processes from a stakeholder view perspective. It will allow differentiating,
categorising and characterising generic learning processes that firms undertake during
their journey towards a changed stakeholder orientation. After a short overview of
existing literature, a learning process framework will be introduced and illustrated with
three case studies. Based on these preliminary empirical findings, several propositions
for future research will be developed.
Stakeholder orientation and organisational learning
This paper contributes primarily to the question of how and why specific stakeholder
orientations change over time. The term ‘stakeholder orientation’ we use here relates to
both normative and instrumental perspectives (Donaldson and Preston 1995). In this
paper we focus on the instrumental perspective that will be further operationalised by
the corporation’s core elements—namely strategy, structure and culture—to enhance
organisational wealth (see Post et al. 2002b: 60-63).
In the field of business and society, developments concerning the question of how a
firm can implement more responsible behaviours already exist (see Ackerman 1973;
Heugens et al. 2002; Post et al. 2002a). Such micro approaches, which can be found in
literature on corporate social responsiveness (Frederick 1978), often relate to organi-
sational processes necessary to implement social policies (e.g. Ackerman 1973; Post et
al. 2002a). However, these approaches tend to be quite static because they usually do
not explain how certain (social) issues arise and subsequently external (social) change
is hardly ever conceptualised (see Frederick 1978). Additionally, these approaches
describe the change of a stakeholder orientation as a more or less ‘guided’ policy process.
Contemporary research on organisational evolution shows that both induced (guided)
and autonomous (unguided) processes continuously shape strategy-making in large and
complex organisations (e.g. Burgelman 1990; Burgelman and Mittman 1994; Lovas and
Ghoshal 2000). Therefore it is assumed that stakeholder-oriented learning processes
can be both directed and conscious initiatives or unguided and less conscious responses
to environmental pressures. Furthermore, the focus will be not on a social policy
construct in a narrow sense but on a comprehensive (strategic, structural and cultural)
understanding of the firm’s stakeholder orientation.
Our idea is to first evaluate the current and some former (earlier) stakeholder orien-
tations of three large and complex firms. Second, we will apply a learning framework
connecting the former state of the stakeholder orientation to the current one. The
difference between the former and the current state will be interpreted as learning
outcomes. By doing this repeatedly during the lifetime of a corporation (whereby specific
marc maurer and sybille sachs
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1 We will use the term ‘learning’ in this paper to express organisational change in the context of the
firm’s stakeholder interactions. It should be noted here that learning—especially associated with so-
called ‘learning organisations’ (see Senge 1990)—may suggest a too optimistic perspective in the
sense that firms will always become more stakeholder-oriented after a learning process. It seems more
plausible to assume that a firm can broaden and shorten its stakeholder orientation by learning
processes.
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events will be considered as reference points for analysis) and comparing the results
with different firms (cases), we may be able to derive some generalisations about the
nature of stakeholder-oriented learning. The choice of such a longitudinal perspective
on stakeholder learning suggests an appropriate theoretical basis for developing a
dynamic learning framework tailored to the needs of modern stakeholder theory. The
evolutionary approach as suggested by Campbell (1969, 1994), Winter (1990), Aldrich
(2000) and others (e.g. Hannan and Freeman 1984; Miner 1991, 1992) will provide such
a sound theoretical basis. 
An evolutionary perspective on stakeholder learning
Since Donald Campbell’s famous essay in the 1960s (see Campbell 1969), evolutionary
thoughts have been applied in the social sciences by many different researchers (e.g.
Aldrich 1979, 2000; Burgelmann and Mittman 1994; Levinthal 1991; Miner 1991, 1992,
1994, 1995; Aldrich and Kenworthy 1999; Baum and McKelvy 1999; Burns and Wholey
1993; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Lovas and Ghoshal 2000; Winter 1990). We will
focus on the most basic concepts, namely the operation of generic evolutionary pro-
cesses necessary for organisational evolution (Langton 1984: 335) whereby organisa-
tional change is interpreted in the form of stakeholder-oriented (organisational) learning
processes. Besides the underlying evolutionary principle of struggle over scarce resources,
the most important evolutionary processes are variation, selection and retention (and
diffusion)2 (Campbell 1969). By the operation of these processes it is possible to develop
a framework for organisational learning in the context of the stakeholder view. The
following simple variation–selection–retention framework is based on three generic
evolutionary processes and is divided accordingly into three distinct stages as illustrated
in Figure 1. This is similar to the evolutionary approach used by Miner (1991, 1994). It
is important to note here that our framework is centred on a focal firm and that it is
tailored for large and complex firms. While the mechanics of the framework could easily
be applied to small and medium-sized firms as well, the easier access to company
information and executives resulted in selecting only large firms for case analysis. An
additional limitation of the framework is that it is only suitable for analysing already
‘established’ (and thus complex) companies, since, without a history to analyse, the
application of the framework seems rather unpromising. 
The first stage conceptualises the learning stimulus that is induced by triggering
events taking place in the focal firm and in its task or its contextual environment. Before
introducing the term ‘triggering event’, some remarks on the two environment types
must be made. The ‘task environment’ refers to all aspects of the environment that are
‘potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment’ (Dill 1958: 410) and it is usually
composed of such (direct) stakeholders as customers, shareholders, suppliers, competi-
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2 Diffusion of variations describes the process of passing retained variations between different organi-
sations of a population (Aldrich 2000: 31). For example, the movement of people between organisa-
tions facilitates knowledge diffusion within industries (e.g. Burns and Wholey 1993). Because the
paper’s focus is on organisational learning of a focal firm and not on inter-organisational learning
processes such as stakeholders learning from the firm, the presented framework—in its current
state—does not explicitly consider such diffusion processes. A special form of inter-organisational
diffusion is ‘mimicking’. It describes the process of firms imitating the behaviour of another (success-
ful) firm, often for instrumental reasons. Even though mimicking is not considered in the current
framework, it seems plausible that such efforts possibly end in either mimicking only the surface of
the other firm’s stakeholder orientation (e.g. by only copying strategy and/or structures of the
[original] firm in a piecemeal fashion) or inducing (adaptive) learning processes in the mimicking
firm. If the latter occurs, the mimicking process itself could be interpreted as a triggering event. 
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tors and employees (Bourgeois 1980). The task environment is thought to be embedded
into the general or contextual environment which includes stakeholders affecting organ-
isations indirectly as for example stakeholders from social, political or demographic
sectors (Trist 1976). Because this paper does not aim to analyse the influence of different
environmental conditions on firm performance, but rather why and how firms learn in
the context of their stakeholder relations, we decided not to differentiate between
different environmental states. Thus, the following framework assumes that the focal
firm is operating in turbulent environments. This assumption is rationalised with
Emery and Trist’s perception made in the 1960s that most contextual environments
(and consequently many task environments) begin to move in a turbulent state (see
Emery and Trist 1965; Schon 1971; Trist 1976; Ansoff 1979). 
Learning stimulus
In turbulent and interconnected (Sachs and Rühli 2002) task and contextual environ-
ments, the changes and the evolution of these two layers are capable of generating
triggering events. This term is borrowed from researchers in the field of industrial crises
(e.g. Kates 1977; Shrivastava 1987, 1995; Shrivastava and Mitroff 1987; Frankel and
Roubini 2001). While Shrivastava (1995) and others use triggering events as a key
characteristic to describe industrial crises, this paper uses the term in a much broader
sense. Table 1 contrasts the differences between interpretations of triggering events.
So far, we differentiate between three types of triggering event, namely developments,
crises and wake-up calls. These events are distinct from each other in multiple dimen-
sions such as scope (focal firm, task environment and contextual environment), man-
agement’s forward notification (whether management perceives changes imposed by
an upcoming event ex ante or ex post) and most importantly by the external selection
pressure these events may trigger. This external selection pressure depends heavily both
on the potential impacts of the variations triggered by an event and on whether the
involved (key) stakeholders represent strong market forces, occupy important resources
(on which the firm is depending), or have access to political, regulatory or other forms
of social power. In Figure 2, the three event types are positioned within a matrix along
marc maurer and sybille sachs
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1. Learning stimulus 2. Learning process 3. Learning outcomes
Contextual
environment
Eliminating
variations
New
variations
Identity
preservation
Adaptation
Task
environment
Firm
Firm
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Crisis
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all
variations
external selection
internal selection
retention
Strategy
Structure Culture
Internal and external
stakeholders
learning
Continuous and fundamental
• Strategic adaptation
• Structural adaptation
• Cultural adaptation
no learning
• Strategic preservation
• Structural preservation
• Cultural preservation
Figure 1 variation–selection–retention framework of stakeholder learning
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the dimensions external selection pressure (impact), scope and management’s forward
notification. 
One of the development-based event’s characteristics is that it is only capable of
triggering low external pressure to the focal firm. Because developments often constitute
themselves in the form of large-scale economic, social, technological, ecological or regu-
latory trends, it is assumed that developments impact the focal firm, task and contextual
environments. If the management of the focal firm perceives such developments, it is
assumed that this ‘forward notification’ happens ex ante (because the corresponding
event comes with low direct pressure for the firm). In contrast to developments, both
crises and wake-up calls generate high levels of external pressure. While crises usually
affect large parts of the focal firm’s task and contextual environments (e.g. a hurricane
JCC 17 Spring 2005 97
implementing the stakeholder view: learning processes for a changed stakeholder orientation
Literature on industrial crises Framework of stakeholder learning
Subcategories tProduction-based and
consumption-based events
tDevelopments, crises and wake-
up calls
Source of event tFailures inside firms,
technological failures, regulatory
failures, and acts of nature (e.g.
earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.)
tBroad set of internal and external
sources in the firm’s task and
contextual environment
Effect of event tLarge-scale damage to human life
and environment
tVariations in the firm’s
stakeholder network; adaptation
or identity preservation
Consequences tEconomic and social costs tEconomic and social costs and
benefits (i.e. by learning)
Stakeholder groups
involved
tMultiple stakeholders (media,
customers, governments, victims
of crisis, shareholders, etc.)
tMarket-based, resource-based
and sociopolitical stakeholders
Table 1 treatment of triggering events
High
external
selection
pressure
management’s
forward
notification
scope of event
Low
No
(ex post
notification)
Yes 
(ex ante
notification)
Focal firm Task environment Contextual environment
Wake-up
call
Crisis
Development
Figure 2 triggering events matrix
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hitting a region where the focal firm is operating can affect the task environment
consisting of local customers, suppliers, employees and other strategic stakeholders as
well as entities in the firm’s contextual environment such as media, (local) government,
etc.), wake-up calls affect—by definition—only the focal firm itself. Since both crises
and wake-up calls release high external pressure on the focal firm it is assumed that
management’s forward notification is ex post.
By the evolution of both task and contextual environments as well as by actions of the
focal firm, potential events are activated and turn into triggering events. These events
will become the reference points for identifying organisational learning processes
within the framework illustrated in Figure 1. All of these events are thought to trigger
internal and external variations. Such variations—which represent the raw material of
organisational evolution (Aldrich 2000: 23)—lead to changes (variations) in the firm’s
stakeholder network. Whether these external variations lead to retained variations
(learning) inside the firm will be determined in stage 2, below.
Learning process 
At the second stage, where the actual learning processes are situated, both internal and
external selection forces are decisive whether the firm adapts its stakeholder orientation
or not. They represent forces that differentially select or selectively eliminate certain
types of variation (Aldrich 2000: 26). The firm’s current stakeholder orientation during
an event is assumed to act like a filter providing internal selection criteria. Internal
selection forces are pressures towards stability and homogeneity (Campbell 1969) and
lead to persistence of past selection criteria, even if these criteria are no longer relevant
in a new (changed) environment (Campbell 1994). According to Hannan and Freeman
(1984), such routinising can enhance a focal firm’s survival changes by increased relia-
bility in performance and accountability for actions. But, as Fischer and Pollock (2004)
conclude, this process also generates ‘strong inertial pressure which discourages organi-
sational change’ (2004: 463) because of the potential for disruption to existing routines,
structures and social norms. External selection pressures are assumed if (external
and/or internal) stakeholders call for an adaptation of the focal firm’s stakeholder orien-
tation. Criteria for external selection are the expectations of stakeholders. These selection
forces do not always correspond to internal and external stakeholders. Thus, cases exist
where external selection forces are represented only by internal stakeholders such as
top management or employees and there are cases where internal selection forces are
nurtured primarily by external stakeholders (e.g. if the focal firm has a strong orientation
towards external shareholders). Following existing literature on stakeholder-oriented
learning (i.e. Post et al. 2002b), we distinguish between three types of learning process:
adaptive learning, renewal learning and transformational learning. A short description
of each of these generic learning types follows.
Adaptive learning 
Adaptive learning involves incremental, gradual changes and adjusting routines and
practices to avoid known mistakes (or risks) and to take advantage of recognised oppor-
tunities. Processes and behaviours are modified within an essentially unchanged config-
uration of corporate strategy, structure and culture (Post et al. 2002b: 200). Adaptive
learning processes are based on the corporation’s core values that already favour a broad
stakeholder orientation. Adaptive learning typically consists of multiple and continuous
single learning loops, although double-loop learning is sometimes possible (2002b:
200). 
marc maurer and sybille sachs
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Transformational learning 
Transformational learning involves fundamental and even disruptive changes within
the focal firm including substantial changes in its core values (Post et al. 2002b: 200).
Significant discontinuities can force such learning, and it may induce changes in an
organisation’s strategy, structure and culture (Drucker 1989). Transformational learn-
ing is characterised by higher-level learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985), meaning that norms,
assumptions and frames of reference are questioned. Such double-loop or even deutero
learning (Bateson 2000) is necessary in order to implement generative changes (Senge
1990) in all three elements of the corporate core. 
Renewal learning 
Renewal learning involves evolutionary and more proactive behaviour, including the re-
examination of assumptions and cognitive frameworks. Basic values and goals may be
pursued in new ways, involving noticeable changes in strategies and structures. The
pending expectations of specific and often dyadic stakeholders (Rowley 1997) can induce
this type of learning process (Post et al. 2002b: 200-202). As transformational learning,
renewal learning consists of both single- and double-loop learning and represents a
mixture of generative and instrumental learning (see Senge 1990). Therefore, this type
of learning can be seen as a step between the previously introduced types of learning,
adaptive and transformational. Renewal learning can be differentiated from adaptive
learning by including significantly more double-loop learning and (discontinuously)
changing one or two of the corporate core elements, and from transformational learning
because the firm’s culture does not get fundamentally changed but is instead ‘renewed’. 
Learning outcomes
The interaction of both external and internal selection forces determines if in stage 3 a
variation in the firm’s environment turns to a strategic and/or structural and/or cultural
variation of the firm’s stakeholder orientation (adaptation) or if the previous stakeholder
orientation becomes ‘imprinted’ and preserved (identity preservation). The outcomes
of the learning processes have an impact not only on the firm (via adaptation or identity
preservation) but also on its environment(s). In the case of an adaptation, external
variations may be eliminated because of the firm’s changed stakeholder orientation. In
the case of an identity preservation, new variations can arise because stakeholders may
switch to escalation strategies (because of the firm’s inactive stance).
Empirical investigations based on comparative case studies
In order to investigate learning processes according to our learning process framework,
we adopt the method of comparative case studies. Since this paper is primarily a
theoretical contribution, we abstain at this point from describing every detail of our
research methodology (e.g. research design, criteria for selecting cases, etc.). The rest
of this section is therefore limited to introducing the first three cases (Swiss Re, Sunrise
and Shell), which will be used to illustrate the development of propositions in the next
section.
Swiss Re Group 
Swiss Re Group is one of the world’s leading and financially strongest reinsurers, with
roughly 9,000 employees. From the point of view of its business, Swiss Re is a knowl-
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edge-based company and therefore sustainable employee relations are a key strategic
factor. Induced by several crisis-based events such as Hurricane Andrew (in 1992) and
other development-based events such as the globalisation of the reinsurance business
and a resulting extensive merger and acquisition strategy, Swiss Re started a transfor-
mational learning process towards a conscious stakeholder-oriented strategic manage-
ment that covers not only employee and shareholder relations but also customers,
regulators and relations to NGOs (non-governmental organisations). The underlying
stakeholder orientation intensified during the 1990s; the mixed normative and instru-
mental orientation of Swiss Re that focused on employees, customers and shareholders
changed towards a broader and even more strategic approach to stakeholder manage-
ment including new key stakeholders (e.g. regulators and NGOs) and changing priorities
within existing key stakeholders (e.g. between employees and shareholders) to support
Swiss Re’s value creation process.
The learning outcomes are—as assumed with transformational learning—funda-
mental changes in strategy (e.g. focusing of corporate strategy, changing stakeholder
priorities, intensifying both the scope and the scale of external communications, etc.),
structure (e.g. Swiss Re divested almost all of its direct insurance activities and went
through a reorganisation process to focus on life, non-life and financial services) and
culture (the effects of globalisation created changes in the dominance of certain national-
based cultures within Swiss Re, subsequently leading towards a new cultural value of
‘multiculturalism’). The challenges of the more recent events (economic downturn and
rise of terrorism) clearly generated new learning processes based on the new risks linked
to these events. Still, these learning processes are not as fundamental as before and
could be characterised as adaptive learning with some elements of renewal learning.
Sunrise 
Sunrise is a telecommunications firm in Switzerland that originated from a merger
between diAx and the former (old) Sunrise in 2001. From the point of view of stakeholder
orientation, the two merger candidates had different experiences and therefore different
path dependencies. As diAx was founded by former managers of the electricity industry
of the Swiss public sector, it had been stakeholder-oriented by an intrinsically motivated
humanistic commitment. But Sunrise—although it had similar roots to those of diAx
as it was also founded by stakeholder-oriented Swiss companies (e.g. SBB, the Swiss
federal railway provider)—had some conflicts with the public authorities and the
telephony market regulators. Following the merger, it was not only necessary to combine
these two very different attitudes towards stakeholders but it turned out that the new
owners of the merged companies—Tele Danmark—also brought in a narrow instru-
mental (shareholder-focused) stakeholder orientation and new management with
almost no experience in the local Swiss business and social context. Challenged by
several events, new Sunrise is now in a post-merger phase and possibly at the initial
stage of a transformational learning process back to a broader instrumental stakeholder
orientation which considers employee, customer, regulator and (local) NGO relations.
Shell 
Shell is one of the leading firms in the oil industry with about 100,000 employees in
more than 140 countries. In terms of the history of events, Shell experienced two chal-
lenges in 1995. First, Shell met with unexpectedly strong opposition (external selection
pressure) when it wanted to dispose of the oil storage buoy Brent Spar in the North
Atlantic. Second, it was accused of destroying indigenous people’s (Ogoni) land in
Nigeria with its drilling activities and of indirectly supporting the Nigerian government’s
marc maurer and sybille sachs
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activities (the Nigerian government executed nine Ogoni people, among them their
spiritual leader Ken Saro-Wiwa). These events, which can be classified as two indepen-
dent wake-up calls, could generate enough external selection pressure in the short term
(especially during 1995 and at the beginning of 1996) to overcome strong path depen-
dencies (i.e. internal selection pressure) set by earlier events (e.g. Shell’s experience
during the Second World War, the Italian bribery affair or the Rhodesian issue; see
Howarth 1997).
These two events strongly influenced a continuous reorganising process induced by
too low a ROACE (return on average capital employed) which was triggered by develop-
ment-based events such as increased competition in Shell’s task environment at the
beginning of 1990s. Shell’s stakeholder orientation has changed since then towards a
more normative stakeholder orientation based on humanistic commitments3 and also
to a broader instrumental stakeholder orientation considering strategic, structural and
cultural adaptations (for further details, see Post et al. 2002b). More recent events in
Shell’s history (e.g. Shell’s proactive behaviour in the Camisea issue (a controversial oil
and gas project in the Peruvian Amazon) in 1998 or the successful clean-up of a serious
oil spill in Sydney Harbour with a minimum of public pressure) demonstrate some of
the retained learning outcomes of the ‘Brent Spar/Nigeria’ learning cycle. Shell at
1995–2000 is therefore an example of a transformational learning process towards a
stakeholder-oriented strategic management.
Development of propositions
In order to guide the reader through the different propositions used in current and
future investigations, Figure 3 illustrates a ‘path model’ to explore the following section.
Proposition 1a: Development-based events tend to induce adaptive stakeholder
learning if the focal firm’s internal selection pressure is low.
We have some evidence in the Sunrise case that, in one of the former firms before the
merger (diAx), there was a substantial amount of adaptive learning in relation to develop-
ment-based events such as the liberalisation of the Swiss telecommunications industry.
Data from this case suggests that diAx—during its founding and start-up phase—had
rather low internal selection forces. A manifestation of this can be seen in the extensive
use of sponsoring strategies aimed at introducing the diAx brand and creating favour-
able relationships with stakeholders. This adaptive posture of diAx was supported by its
corporate culture—characterised by former diAx managers as a ‘gold rush’ mentality4—
which included an intrinsic commitment towards a broad set of stakeholders but
especially towards employees. This culture along with a flat structure and a clear and
adaptive growth strategy aimed at grasping the entrepreneurial chance given by the
development-based event, the liberalisation of the Swiss telecommunications industry.
These patterns may help to explain the adaptive cycles of diAx during its early existence.
Proposition 1b: Development-based events lead to strategic preservation and to
structural and cultural preservation if the focal firm’s internal selection pressure
is high. 
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3 Shell articulated its new core purpose as ‘helping people build a better word’ (Shell 1997).
4 Typical for this kind of start-up and ‘work hard–play hard’ (see Deal and Kennedy 1982) culture is
that, at diAx, every employee addressed everybody (including the CEO) informally and employees
often slept in their offices to save time for working harder. Other symbols of this culture can bee seen
in the diAx-motto ‘Every day has 24 hours’, and in having parties at diAx every week.
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The second company that merged with diAx to form the new Sunrise—old Sunrise—
provides an example for such ‘non-learning’ as described by Proposition 1b. The event
‘beauty contest for mobile telephony licences’—with its overwhelming importance for
both diAx and old Sunrise—led to different consequences for the two companies. For
diAx, the success of obtaining a licence was a breakthrough in a new, fast-growing and
profitable market segment which led to a high investment strategy and to an extremely
strong growth of diAx. New structures had to be built up and the drive of the winner
mentality dominated the still employee-oriented culture of diAx. For old Sunrise, not
obtaining a licence for mobile telephony led to strategic preservation (by focusing on
the fixed net customers) and to an inactive and reactive stance against one of its strategic
stakeholders (i.e. the regulators). Although old Sunrise had no strong internal selection
pressures because of its short history, the negative signal from the regulatory authorities
marc maurer and sybille sachs
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1. Learning stimulus 2. Learning process
Corresponding stage in framework of stakeholder learning
3. Learning outcomes
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Internal selection
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Internal selection
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strategic adaptation
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structural adaptation
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cultural adaptation
Strategic preservation
Structural preservation
Cultural preservation
Fundamental
strategic adaptation
Fundamental
structural adaptation
Fundamental
cultural adaptation
P1a
P1b
P2a
P2b
P3a
Proposition, sub-proposition Independent variable Dependent variable
Figure 3 path model of propositions
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concerning the mobile telephony licence limited old Sunrise’s strategic options and
consequently its corporate core did not change but was deepened (imprinted). Therefore
the tendency at old Sunrise to interact reactively with regulators after the beauty event
could be explained by internal selection pressure built up by that previous experience.
So the event ‘beauty contest for mobile telephony licences’ can be seen as a (positive)
‘crisis’ for diAx (see also Propositions 3a–3b) and as a development-based event for old
Sunrise with the effects of stronger strategic imprinting (i.e. by focusing on present
customer groups), structural preservation and deepening of Sunrise’s core values which
favoured customer orientation.5
Proposition 1c: Adaptive stakeholder learning leads towards continuous and incre-
mental adaptations of either strategy, and/or structure, and/or culture of focal firm
with respect to its stakeholder relations.
Evidence from the Swiss Re and Sunrise cases tends to support proposition 1c. So recent
structural modifications of Swiss Re (e.g. the creation of a new organisational unit
responsible for ‘sustainability’) can be seen as the result of an adaptive learning process
triggered by developments (e.g. global warming). Such structural adaptations cannot be
considered as a radical (fundamental) change (because ‘sustainability’ was managed at
Swiss Re even before the recent structural modification) but instead as a continuous
development within Swiss Re. The former diAx in the Sunrise case has used adaptive
learning to improve its already good relations with regulators during the early stages
which enabled diAx to influence further regulations (e.g. concerning mobile communi-
cations and the acquisition of a UMTS licence in 2000) in order to adapt the strategy for
mobile telephony of (now merged) Sunrise.
Proposition 2a: Crisis-based events tend to induce renewal stakeholder learning if
the focal firm’s internal selection pressure is low.
Although crises can release significantly more external pressure than developments, it
is still necessary (for renewal learning to take place) that internal selection pressures are
not too high 
In the Swiss Re case, we could observe some aspects of renewal learning that are still
ongoing within the firm. If we look at the events leading to this, it looks as if renewal
learning is more likely to happen when it is induced by several crises (economic
downturn, rise of terrorism, new regulations) because these crises can mobilise enough
external selection pressure to overcome organisational inertia (internal selection pres-
sures). Nevertheless, crises seem to mobilise enough pressure to fundamentally change
at least parts of the corporate core. Thus, for example in the Swiss Re case, the events
economic downturn and new regulations pushed the (strategic) priorities of share-
holders and regulators and (slightly) decreased those of employees. The renewal learn-
ing process at diAx triggered by the event ‘beauty contest for mobile telephony’ (which
facilitated a quick expansion of diAx’s mobile business) provides an example showing
that crises can have positive impacts on firms that can react quickly and adapt to the
altered environment. But, in general, such renewal learning processes are often accom-
panied by a defensive or reactive strategy towards the stakeholders involved in the crisis.
A proactive or interactive stance is no longer possible in the face of a crisis since the
management’s forward notification occurs ex post and external pressure subsequently
makes it impossible for management to choose strategies other than reactive (which
implies renewal learning) or inactive ones (see next proposition 2b).
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5 This value ‘customer orientation’ is also reflected in the firm’s name. Although it was originally
founded (in 1996) as ‘Newtelco AG’ it was soon decided to label products and services under the
‘sunrise’ brand in order to position the company not as a ‘high-tech’ company but instead as being
‘heart-tech’.
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Proposition 2b: Renewal stakeholder learning leads to strategic persistence and to
structural and cultural preservation if the focal firm’s internal selection pressure
is high.
When crisis-based events fail to generate enough external selection pressure to
overcome internal selection pressures, then the focal firm follows an inactive strategy
towards the stakeholders concerned by the crisis. Such an inactive tenure leads to
stronger imprinting of the focal firm’s initial strategy and subsequently increases inter-
nal selection pressures for future events. The inactive strategy on the part of the focal
firm can also result in stakeholders involved in the event switching to escalation
strategies which may increase external selection pressure on the firm. In this sense, a
crisis for a whole industry (or nation) can transform into a wake-up call for some firms
(which follow inactive strategies to resist external selection pressure). An example of
this situation can be seen in the Nigeria issue for Shell in 1995. The event ‘indictment
and execution of nine Ogoni leaders’ can be viewed as a crisis for a wide range of social
entities. Shell’s inactive position concerning public expectations had turned this event
into a wake-up call (see also Proposition 3a). This stance in the Nigerian issue can be
explained by referring to strong internal selection pressures generated by Shell’s earlier
(and negative) experiences when taking ‘political actions’.
Proposition 2c: Renewal stakeholder learning changes fundamentally either strat-
egy, and/or structure, and incrementally changes (renews) the culture of the focal
firm with respect to its stakeholder relations.
While crises seem suitable to induce radical (fundamental) changes in a corporation’s
strategy and structure (see examples following Proposition 2a), the effect of renewal
learning on culture tends to be less fundamental. Thus, the example of Swiss Re and
earlier (similar) case studies of Motorola (e.g. Peach 1999; Post et al. 2002b) show that
the culture of a firm in a renewal learning process is reaffirmed (renewed) but not
fundamentally changed. In this sense, the efforts of Swiss Re at the beginning of 2003
to launch an internal campaign to reaffirm corporate values can be understood as one
initiative in the context of a larger renewal process. Finally, the relationship between
wake-up calls and transformational learning is conceptualised with the following set of
propositions.
Proposition 3a: Wake-up calls tend to induce transformational stakeholder learning
no matter whether the focal firm’s internal selection pressure is high or low.
Shell is an exemplary case for the relation stated by proposition 3a. It is hard to think of
Shell’s (proactive) behaviour in the Camisea issue without the earlier experiences
generated by the two wake-up calls ‘Brent Spar’ and ‘Nigeria’. The combined pressure
from two wake-up calls could overcome Shell’s strong organisational inertia and enabled
a transformational learning process during the second half of the 1990s. However, the
data from Swiss Re suggests that transformational learning processes can also occur
without any wake-up calls. Swiss Re’s transformational learning process towards a
global company (between 1995 and 2000) seems to have resulted without any true wake-
up call but because of multiple and parallel development and crisis-based events. The
preconditions for developments and crises to result in transformational learning seem
to be multiple and at least partially parallel events and a certain level of stakeholder
orientation already present within the corporation concerned. 
Proposition 3b: Transformational stakeholder learning fundamentally changes
strategy and structure, and culture with respect to the firm’s stakeholder relations.
Both Shell and Swiss Re are examples of the fundamental changes generated by transfor-
mational learning. All three dimensions of the corporation’s core (strategy, structure
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and culture) are affected, whereby the impacts on culture seem to be one of the main
benefits of transformational learning. While the other two learning types (adaptive and
renewal) are also capable of inducing (incremental) changes in the cultural configura-
tion of a firm, transformational learning seems to lead to far more fundamental cultural
adaptations. Another argument for associating transformational learning with funda-
mental change in the focal firm’s corporate core is associated with the observation that,
in times of wake-up calls, large and complex firms (which are often more exposed to the
public than smaller firms) tend to switch to new management teams which often follow
new strategies, implement new structures and come with different mind-sets and
attitudes towards stakeholders.
Conclusions and future research
In general, the preliminary results of the three case studies do fit well into the proposed
framework of stakeholder learning. By its application, it is possible to explain changes
in a firm’s stakeholder orientation over time. Surprisingly, we identified in the Swiss Re
case a transformational learning process relating to developments and crises. To handle
this issue within the framework, we will further develop it and apply it to other case
studies in order to find out if the relation between transformational learning and events
is more complex. This is connected to a more general question of whether the con-
ceptualisation of (only) three event types is enough to capture all cases in business
practice. For example it could be advantageous for the framework if the event-type ‘crisis’
could be differentiated into such crises that only affect the focal firm and its task
environment (e.g. the bankruptcy of an industry-wide important supplier) and such
crises that affect the firm and its contextual environment (e.g. terrorism). A still open
issue is the possibility of events switching their type. Such ‘event switching’ can often
be observed when industry-wide crises turn for some firms into a wake-up call. This
may mean that event types have distinct ‘life-cycle’ profiles which could further help in
distinguishing events. Another interesting area relates to the question of whether the
stakeholders themselves learn in the context of the firm’s stakeholder-oriented learning
processes. While it seems rational to assume that a dyadic relation (such as a firm–
stakeholder relation) has effects on both sides, the framework presented in this paper
is aimed to be firm-focused. But it seems to be a promising methodological and empiri-
cal step to include and examine the effects of stakeholder learning on stakeholders and
thus to extend the framework’s scale (see also footnote 2). By now, it seems better to
further investigate the nature of stakeholder-oriented learning processes to derive at
least limited generalisations about their characteristics and occurrence. Thus, future
empirical investigations in the Swiss telecommunications industry will show if our
conceptualisation of stakeholder-oriented learning processes is supported by data from
further (fully fledged) comparative case studies.
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